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Abstract
This paper develops a signaling theory where brain drain as well as the opposite of
brain drain, a phenomenon we call “lame-drain” can result. In particular, we assume
there are three types of agents according to their intrinsic abilities; education (with
endogenous intensity) consists of two stages: undergraduate and graduate. There
are two types of jobs: entry level and managerial. It is shown that under some
circumstances the equilibrium is semi-pooling where the medium type chooses to
work after undergraduate education while (a fraction of) both high and low types
pursue graduate studies at home and abroad. Some high and low ability students
return to work in the indigenous country in equilibrium. However, our model diﬀers
from the traditional brain drain models in that some low ability agents also go abroad
in equilibrium and work in the host country after graduation, resulting in the recipient
country hiring low ability agents, a phenomenon we call lame-drain. We then provide
empirical evidence that lame-drain is indeed happening using U.S. Census data.
Keywords: Brain Drain; Lame Drain; Signalling
JEL: C72; F22; J61
1 Introduction
In their recent survey on the development of the literature on Brain Drain, Gibson
and McKenzie (2011) show that there is a strong positive empirical association be-
tween skilled and unskilled migration both in the cross section and over time. The
voluminous immigration economics literature has been mostly centered around the
issue of immigration’s impact on the wages in the U.S. labor market, especially for
low skilled natives, ie., high school dropouts or workers with only a high school edu-
cation. There is however, still a great deal of disagreement on whether immigration
has lowered the earnings of native workers. For example, Borjas (2003) and Aydemir-
Abdurrahman-Borjas (2007) showed that immigration does reduce wages, while Card
(2005, 2009) on the other hand argues that the earnings of low skilled natives are not
much aﬀected. But overall little attention has been paid to the group of high skilled
employment-based immigrants. Nor is there any study we know of that looks at the
quality and particularly the variation in quality over time of this type of immigration.
Employment-based immigration, which is usually filed by aliens with advanced
education degrees, accounts for nearly 40% of the total immigrant visas issued each
year in the U.S. The lack of attention to this cohort is presumably rooted in the
implicit assumption that these are world talents that U.S. should wholeheartedly
embrace with open arms. In fact it is sometimes argued that American greatness
stems from and still depends on immigration and assimilation of talent brains from
around the world.
The separate brain drain literature however, looks at the same issue from an op-
posite perspective, the perspective from developing countries on factors explaining
causes why talents from developing countries who have acquired advanced degrees
from universities in developed countries would like to continue to stay and find em-
ployment in host countries, and how to prevent the brain drain phenomenon from
happening. Causes include lack of jobs for returning graduates, lower salary levels in
the home country and preference for higher living standards abroad, e.g., Kwok and
Leland (1982).1 While these factors seem to be consistent with historic observations,
the brain drain literature, similar to the immigration literature, by and large has been
built on the premises that what is drained from developing countries to developed
countries is indeed talent brain. In this paper we provide empirical evidences that
this premise may not always be true. At the very least, our study identifies a trend of
deteriorating quality in employment-based immigration under some circumstances.
One needs to look no further than to China to understand the issue we propose,
the country that exports most students to the developed world. China currently has
about 400,000 university students abroad, most of whom are not expected to return.
A 2007 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) found that of the
1Other explanations of brain drain include in the following: Miyagiwa (1991) argues that there
are scale economies in high education, hence brain drain may raise the eﬃciency of educational
institutions and income levels of the source country. Mountford (1997) claims that when the immi-
gration decision is random in that the visa issuance by US immigration authority to applicants is a
noisy function of their productivity, it may increase the average productivity in the home country.
In Lien and Wang (2005), a two-dimensional decision on language skill and knowledge education
levels is considered.
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one million Chinese students who had studied overseas from 1978 to 2006, 70% did
not return.2 The large overseas student population from China needs to be viewed in
the context of the largest high education expansion in Chinese history. In the 1980s,
only 2-3% of high school graduates went on to college education. The figure increased
to 17% in 2003. The watershed year was 1999, when the number of students enrolled
jumped by almost half. Since the late 1990s, the breakneck expansions of overall
campuses and enrollment are at an amazing rate — increasing by six-fold in the last
six years.3
The Great Leap Forward in high education in China is largely driven by the Chi-
nese government that sets ambitious employment goals in a burgeoning urbanization
period. It increases substantially college admission quota over the years via adminis-
trative orders in its almost entirely publicly owned higher education sector. On the
other hand, tuition rates are deregulated. Universities once almost entirely dependent
on government funding during the planned economy era are now able to boost their
revenues from fast-rising tuitions and fees. As a result, universities are admitting
more and more less-qualified students.
The proliferation of high education to such a large population in such a short
period of time inevitably leads to the degrading of education qualities and the gen-
eration of a pool of less qualified college graduates. A well-known 2005 study by
McKinsey revealed a paradox of shortages amid plenty.4 Of the country’s 1.6 million
young engineers, it is estimated only 10% were suﬃciently well trained to work in
multinational companies, a talent pool no larger than that in the UK. As the number
of college graduates balloons, the value of their degrees has plummeted. It has been
reported that many recent graduates have found only menial jobs or none at all. The
average starting salary of college graduates of some majors is even less than that of
migrant workers.
The adverse impact of the high education expansion in China evidently spills over
to the other side of the Pacific, as many college graduates, including obviously those
unskilled, unqualified and unemployed go abroad for graduate studies. In addition,
a large number of Chinese students who failed in the competitive national college
entrance exams went onto universities in developed countries including the US.5 And
many of them are unlikely to return to China. And this emmigration of unskilled,
unqualified and unemployed studetns to developed countries seems to be the exact
opposite of the brain-drain issue, or that of lame-drain, a term we coined and will
use in the rest of the paper.
We first propose a theory to explain that the lame-drain phenomenon is quite
2In the last decade of the 20th century, 460,000 people from the Chinese mainland settled in the
U.S. From 2000 to 2005, some 355,000 more Chinese immigrated to the United States, the CASS
report found.
3Helen Joyce and James Miles, “China Goes to School,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong
Kong: Nov 2008. Vol. 171(9); pg. 47
4Diana Farrell and Andrew Grant, “Addressing China’s looming talent shortage,” McKinsey
Global Institute, October 2005
5“China Props Up Foreign Students’ Numbers in U.S.,” the Chronicle of Higher Education,
November 15, 2010. For example, Michigan State University went from having 4 Chinese freshmen
in 2005 out of 202 incoming foreign students, to 445 out of 678 the fall of 2010.
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possible, especially when the home country that exports students is fast developing
and the wage levels between the home and the host country tend to equalize. The
theory also shows that international flow of both talent-brains and lame-brains can
be driven by factors other than diﬀerences in wage levels and living standards.
We then go on to present an empirical study to validate the lame-drain phenom-
enon. In particular, we use the 2010 U.S. Census data and provide two pieces of
collaborating empirical evidence: for Chinese students who moved to the U.S. after
the higher education expansion in China, (1) the return to a graduate degree is lower
than those who moved before; (2) those with low abilities are more likely to obtain
a graduate degree. The first point suggests a deteriorating quality of employment-
based immigration from China, suggesting what is drained from China to the US in
recent years may not be the brightest brains but very likely the result of the high
education expansion in China spilled over to the US. The second point reinforces the
theme that low-ability students tend to use higher education merely as a signaling
instrument to find employment, an observation consistent with the Spence model.
Our model uses a modified Spence model as the basic setup. Since the seminal
papers by Spence (1973, 1974), economists understand that educational credentials
serve as perfect signals of their intrinsic abilities for employers in an adverse selec-
tion environment. There are three basic conclusions drawn from the original papers:
(i) no pooling equilibrium can sustain; (ii), at most there is one separating equilib-
rium; and (iii) equilibrium does not always exist. In the original Spence model, high
ability students must accept completely unproductive and costly education merely
to distinguish themselves from their less competent counterparts, which leads to the
over-education equilibrium. However, the analysis was purely from the labor mar-
ket’s point of view, in which the schools play a passive role in providing education
without strategic interactions with either students or employers. The implications on
education quality or signaling content of education would change however, if such an
assumption is relaxed. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2003) find that when the assignment
function from the student’s ability to job desirability is concave, then a school will
be better oﬀ to mix the high-ability students with low ability ones through coarsing
information content of grades. In that case, high ability students suﬀer as the value
of a good education becomes diluted.6
Our paper is related to the strand of literature that extends the original Spence
model. Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas (2007) show that ability and competence of a
worker are not observable at the time he enters the labor market, but can be learned
by employers from job performance over time, and the salary then changes. One
important modification of the original Spence model is that education can improve
agents’ productivity in addition to the signaling purpose. Indeed, Fang (2006) esti-
mates that education enhances attendees’ productivity by 40%, and this amounts to
a two thirds of the college wage premium. Swinkels (1999) shows that when educa-
tion improves productivity, pooling equilibrium may arise. Hence less able workers
tend to be over-educated, and more able ones are under-educated, compared with
the benchmark case where education has no productivity improvement. Lee (2007)
6In a recent working paper, Yue and Yang (2011) discovered, using survey data, that 36% and
42% of master and PhD graduates in China respectively are overeducated.
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considers the impact of timing of signaling on the education quality and intensity at
diﬀerent stages of education, which may partially explain why Asian students work
harder in high schools but Americans work harder in universities.
The current paper oﬀers interpretations when and why brain drain may happen, in
a two country model with diﬀerent education systems (planned vs. market oriented)
and otherwise identical settings. Aside from the new empirical findings, our theory
provides validation for international flows of both talent and lame brains. The mixed
bag of both types of brains from developing countries to developed countries indicates
that this is not always detrimental to the source country, as it is eﬀectively exporting
low productivity workers. The previous literature (Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmen-
stein and Prskawetz (1998), Vidal (1998) and Beine, Docquier and Rapaport (2001))
attempted to rationalize this result based on uncertainty about the ability to migrate
and the assumption that firms cannot screen eﬀectively immigrants’ innate ability due
to information asymmetry. In contrast, our analysis suggests that brain drain may
be globally welfare worsening, because of the more costly semi-pooling in developed
countries compared with the case of no international talent flows at all. This brings
about important policy implications with respect to the recent immigration reform
debate in the US. Our analysis indicates the importance of eﬀective screening of en-
tering foreign students by universities and the federal government. It also stresses the
federal government’s initiative to help private firms with the job screening process
with respect to foreign graduates, and improve upon the process of how H-1 visas
and work permits are issued.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model re-
spectively for a developed country and a developing country. Section 3 presents our
empirical results. Section 4 looks at the issue of talent flows between those two
countries. Conclusions and remarks are contained in section 5.
2 The Model
In this section, we first build two closed economy models for a developed and develop-
ing country respectively, where students are not allowed to pursue overseas education.
We establish equilibrium education intensities, tuition levels, and wage rates for dif-
ferent types of agents pursuing diﬀerent types of jobs in these two models. In the rest
of this paper, the terms, the developed country, or the North, or the market oriented
economy refer to the same concept. Likewise, the terms, the developing country, the
South, and the transition economy are used interchangeably.
2.1 Model Setup
Assume that there are three types of agents in an economy, i.e., type H, typeM and
type L, denoting respectively high ability, medium ability and low ability agents. The
diﬀerence among them is the intrinsic ability (which eventually aﬀects productivity),
θi, i = H,M,L, where θH > θM > θL. An agent’s instrinc ability is his private
information. The entire population is normalized to 1, and the proportion of type i
agents is denoted by φi, with
P
i=H,M,L φi = 1.
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Universities provide two vertically separate education programs at undergraduate
and graduate levels. Use j = 1, 2 to denote undergraduate and graduate education,
respectively. Let the quality of education level j be ej, and the corresponding tuition
be γj. Similar to Spence (1974), we assume students of higher ability incur less
private costs in pursuing a given degree. Specifically, the total cost of education for
agent i to pursue education level j, Ci(ej), is the sum of eﬀort, or the disutility of
receiving education plus the tuition paid:
Ci(ej) =
e2j
2θi
+ γj.
Note that the above formulaton implies that the educational cost is inversely
related to an agent’s ability, and convex in education intensity.
In the labor market, assume that only two types of jobs are oﬀered in each econ-
omy, i.e., blue-collar jobs for undergraduate degree holders (job type k = 1) and
white-collar jobs for graduate degree holders (job type k = 2). The true ability of an
agent hunting type k job is detected by the employer with a probability pk, k = 1, 2.7
Assume that it is easier for an employer oﬀering blue-collar jobs to learn the true
ability of an agent than one oﬀering white-collar jobs, i.e., p1 > p2. This may be
justified by the fact that the nature of a blue-collar job is more simplistic and repet-
itive, requiring less creative intrinsic abilities. Detection is assumed to be costless.
The labor market is assumed to be employer competitive, i.e., employers make zero
expected profit in equilibrium. The wage rate is denoted by ωk.
Let the productivity of type i agents be yi, where i = H,M,L. yi is the sum of
intrinsic ability θi and the education intensity of the corresponding level that type i
pursues,8 i.e.,
yi = θi +
X
j=1,2
εijej, (2.1)
where i = H,M,L, and εij is a binary variable such that
εij =
½
1,
0,
if i pursues education level j;
if i does not pursue education level j.
Note that our formulation above makes an agent’s productivity to be dependent
on education intensity, whereas in Spence (1974) productivity is independent of educ-
tioin, only serving as a signalling instrument in the job-seeking process.
University revenues are the sum of all the tuitions collected,9 namely,
R =
X
i=L,M,H
X
j=1,2
εijφiγj.
7Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas (2007) argue that an employee’s ability is not observable at the
time he enters the labor market. Our model, on the contrary, assumes that an employer has a
probability to detect an employee’s ability during the interview, since our model is a static model
and our focus is not on labor contracting issues.
8This is where we diﬀer from most first generation education models (Spence 1973, 1974) where
the agent’s productivity is intrinsic ability alone and it does not vary in response to education
received. Education then serves as a signalling instrument only.
9For simplicity, assume that there is no cost for universities to provide education.
5
Universities maximize their revenues through optimally setting tuitions as a func-
tions of education intensities.
Agents choose education levels, or determine εij. Assuming agents are risk neutral,
the utility of type i agents, Uij, is:
Uij =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0,
Ei[ω1]− Ci(e1),
Ei[ω2]−
P
j=1,2Ci(ej),
if i pursues no education;
if i pursues education 1 (j = 1);
if i pursues both education 1 and 2 (j = 2),
(2.2)
where i = H,M,L, and Ei[ωk] is the expected wage rate of type i agents working
at type k jobs. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the reservation utilities
of agents pursuing diﬀerent education intensities. The indiﬀerence curves show the
positive relationship between wages and education intensities. Any point above each
indiﬀerence curve represents corresponding utility surplus and vice versa.
e
w
O
UM1=0
UL2=0
UL1=0
UM2=0
UH1=0
UH2=0
r1+r2
r1
Figure 1. Indiﬀerence Curves with Reservation (Zero) Utilities
2.2 The North Model
Let us first consider a market oriented economy where a revenue-maximizing univer-
sity faces no external mandates or restrictions on admissions. The assumption that
schools play an active role in admission, acting as profit-maximizing agents, is in
line with the reality of both developed and developing countries. For example, Win-
ston (1999) asserts, “high education is a business: it produces and sells educational
services to customers for a price it buys inputs with which to make that product.”
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As customary in this type of signaling setup, there could be multiple types of
equilibrium arising, depending on the parametric values of the model. For example
in one extreme case, the university could set tuition levels so low such that all types
of students are admitted for both undergraduate and graduate education. Since our
focus in this paper is on human talent flows between the North and the South, we
only focus on two types of equilibrium that resemble respectively stylized facts of each
country. In the North, a separating equilibrium arises, where type L agents do not
pursue university education and thus are not employed, where type M agents only
pursue undergraduate education and are employed for blue-collar jobs, and where
type H agents pursue both undergraduate and graduate education and are employed
for white-collar jobs.
The equilibrium of interest in the South model is a semi-pooling one, where all the
agents choose to receive undergraduate education in equilibrium, but type M agents
choose to take blue-collar jobs after undergraduate studies while type L andH agents
pursue graduate education and are able to take white-collar jobs. We characterize
necessary conditions for both types of equilibrium in the North as well as in the
South.
The North model is essentially a minor extension of the Spence (1974) model by
incorporating an additional type of L agents who in equilibrium are not employed
anyway, and nor do they invest in education at all. Our South model is tailored to
capture some of the defining characteristics of the education system in fast developing
countries such as China, where universities have gone through a period of rapid
expansion, granting degrees of inflated value to a vast number of under-qualified
graduates, many of whom are unemployed or underemployed, greatly suppressing the
wage level for white-collar workers.
When type M agents only pursue undergraduate education and type H agents
pursue both undergraduate and graduate education in equilibrium, εM1 = εH1 =
εH2 = 1. Type L agents would have no incentive to pursue any type of education at
all due to high education intensities and high tuitions 10. Hence type L agents are
unemployed.
The separating equilibrium in the North suggests that employers can definitely
tell the type of a candidate job seeker from his/her academic degree. From an em-
ployer’s perspective, blue-collar workers are recognized as type M agents pursuing
only undergraduate education and contributing yM |e1 in productivity. The corre-
sponding wage is then ω1. Meanwhile, employers gain yH |e2 from those white-collar
workers who are recognized as type H agents holding graduate degrees. ω2 would
be their corresponding wage level. The employer’s profit is the diﬀerence between
productivity gains and wage payments. Then the non-negative profit constraints, or
individual rationality constraints, on the part of the employers are:
yM |e1 − ω1 ≥ 0, (2.3)
10Theorem 7 in subsection 3.4 indicates that assumption 1 exclude the possibility that colleges
have any incentive to decrease the education intensities and tuitions and admit type L agents without
external restrictions on admissions. theorem 7 here, correct assumption 1, proof put in the appendix
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and
yH |e2 − ω2 ≥ 0. (2.4)
In an employer-competitive labor market, constraints (2.3) and (2.4) are binding.
Substituting equation (2.1) into binding constraints (2.3) and (2.4) to substitute yM |e1
and yH |e2 yields the expression for equilibrium wages:
ω1 = θM + e1, (2.5)
and
ω2 = θH + e1 + e2. (2.6)
Next, we present a set of incentive compatible constraints of the separating equi-
librium in this signaling game, meaning the agents have no incentive to mimic other
types. Specifically, for type M agents, working for blue-collar jobs brings them ω1
and costs CM(e1). Hence, the expected income of type M agents working for white-
collar jobs is [(1 − p2)ω2 + p2 · 0], that is, (1 − p2)ω2, compensating for the cost
[CM(e1) + CM(e2)]. Therefore type M’s incentive compatibility constraint is as fol-
lows. Note that (2.7) implies that typeM agents have no incentive to pursue graduate
education.
ω1 − CM(e1) ≥ (1− p2)ω2 − CM(e1)− CM(e2). (2.7)
For the type H agents, they will gain ω2 when working for white-collar jobs. The
cost of education is [CH(e1) + CH(e2)]. Mimicking type M agents to work for blue-
collar jobs however will incur a wage ω1. But the cost of education is reduced to
CH(e1). Then the incentive compatibility constraint of type H agents becomes:
ω2 − CH(e1)− CH(e2) ≥ ω1 − CH(e1). (2.8)
We next assume the university has bargaining power over students in setting
tuitions and consequently determines agents’ education intensities in equilibrium.
Therefore the set of individual rationality constraints requires non-negative utility
for type M and type H agents:
ω1 − CM(e1) ≥ 0, (2.9)
and
ω2 − CH(e1)− CH(e2) ≥ 0. (2.10)
It is then straightforward to obtain the following:
1. Constraint (2.8) is binding. Because the university has bargaining power and
can raise graduate education tuitions to increase CH(e2) without aﬀecting other
inequalities. The binding constraint (2.8) implies that in equilibrium, type
H agents are indiﬀerent between pursuing both education levels and pursuing
undergraduate education only.
2. Constraint (2.7) must hold in strict inequality. This can be seen by substituting
ω1 in the binding constraint (2.8) into constraint (2.7), meaning that type M
agents will never mimic type H agents to pursue graduate education.
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3. Constraint (2.9) is also binding, for the same reason that the university can
raise undergraduate education tuition level to increase CM(e1) without aﬀecting
other inequalities. That is to say, type M agents have no rent in equilibrium.
4. Constraint (2.10) always holds if constraints (2.9) and (2.8) are satisfied. Hence,
constraint (2.10) is excessive, suggesting that type H agents have informational
rent in equilibrium.
Expanding constraints (2.8) and (2.9) and solving simultaneously for γ1 and γ2
yields
γ1 = ω1 −
e21
2θM
, (2.11)
and
γ2 = ω2 − ω1 −
e22
2θH
. (2.12)
Substituting ω1 and ω2 in equations (2.5) and (2.6) into equations (2.11) and
(2.12) yield the relationship between the tuition levels and education levels, i.e.,
γ1 = θM + e1 −
e21
2θM
, (2.13)
and
γ2 = (θH − θM) + e2 −
e22
2θH
. (2.14)
The separating equilibrium suggests that (φM+φH) agents pursue undergraduate
education, and only φH agents pursue graduate education. Thus, the university’s
maximization problem becomes
max
γ1,γ2
R = (φM + φH)γ1 + φHγ2 (2.15)
subject to equations (2.13) and (2.14).
In equations (2.13) and (2.14), tuitions are quadratic functions of corresponding
education levels. Thus the objective function in the maximization problem in (2.15)
is concave, guaranteeing the unique existence of the optimal education intensities that
maximize tuition levels. The solution to (2.15) is summarized in Table 1 below, and
we summarize the main separating equilibrium result in Proposition 1.
Table 1: Equilibrium Education Intensities, Wages and Tuitions in a
Market-oriented Economy
Variable Education Level (j) 1 2
Subscripts Job Type (k) 1 2
Education Intensities
¡
e∗j
¢
θM θH
Wages (ω∗k) 2θM 2θH + θM
Tuitions
¡
γ∗j
¢
3
2
θM 32θH − θM
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Proposition 1 In a separating equilibrium of the North model, type M agents only
pursue undergraduate education, type H agents pursue both undergraduate and gradu-
ate education, and type L agents do not pursue any higher education. The equilibrium
education intensities, wages, and tuitions are provided in Table 1.
Proof. The analysis so far shows the results for typesH andM agents as summarized
in Table 1. Here we show that type L agents choose to receive no education at all.
As is defined in equation (2.2), the utility of type L agents receiving undergraduate
education and working for blue-collar jobs is
UL1 = (1− p1)ω∗1 − CL(e∗1).
From Table 1, we have that e∗1 = θM , ω∗1 = 2θM and γ∗1 =
3
2
θM . Then,
(1− p1)ω∗1 − CL(e∗1) = 2(1− p1)θM −
θ2M
2θL
− 3
2
θM
= −1
2
θM − θL
θL
θM − 2p1θM < 0,
which implies that type L agents have no incentive to pursue undergraduate educa-
tion.
Similarly, the utility of type L agents receiving both undergraduate and graduate
education and working at white-collar jobs is
(1− p2)ω∗2 − CL(e∗1)− CL(e∗2) = −
1
2
θM − θL
θL
θM −
1
2
θH − θL
θH
θH − 2p2θH < 0,
which implies that type L students have no incentive to pursue graduate education
either.
Proposition 1 implies that the university sets the tuition levels and determines the
corresponding equilibrium education levels. This separating equilibrium indirectly
excludes type L agents from education and employment. In Figure 2, we provide a
schematic representation of the separating equilibrium in this model, which is labeled
as A and B. The equilibrium education intensities, e∗1 and e∗2, as well as equilibrium
tuition levels, γ∗1 and γ∗2, are also depicted along the two axes.
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e1* e2*
A
B
UL2=0
UM1=0
UL1=0
UM2=0
UH1=0
UH2=0
r2*
r1*
U*H1
U*H2
C
D
Figure 2. A Separating Equilibrium in the North model
Five observations are worth noting from Figure 2.
• Point A is at the intersection of U∗H1 and U∗H2, which are in parallel with curves
UH1 = 0 and UH2 = 0, respectively. This suggests that in equilibrium, type
H agents are indiﬀerent between pursuing both education levels and pursuing
only undergraduate education;
• Point A is above curves UH1 = 0 and UH2 = 0, indicating that type H agents
have informational rent in equilibrium;
• Point A is below curve UM2 = 0, indicating that type M agents will not mimic
type H agents to pursue graduate education;
• Point B is on the curve UM1 = 0, indicating that type M agents have no
informational rent in equilibrium;
• Both points A and B are below curves UL1 = 0 and UL2 = 0. This suggests
that type L agents are unemployed. The reason is that tuitions are too high for
a type L agent, which is reflected by the fact that point C is above point D.
2.3 The South Model
In this section we consider a transition economy where the education system is subject
to government intervention to meet certain social goals. Suppose the government
authority places high priority on social stability and attempts to achieve universal
undergraduate education for all citizens. This entails an aggressive expansionary
11
policy of the education industry to meet mandatory university enrollment for all
types of agents. This scenario is actually not unreal in China as the college student
population grows at an astonishing rate in recent years.
Under this circumstance, universities have to decrease their tuition level to at-
tract type L agents to college as well. It can be shown that under certain conditions
a semi-pooling equilibrium emerges, where type M agents only pursue undergradu-
ate education, while both type L and H agents pursue not only undergraduate but
graduate education as well.
In this semi-pooling equilibrium, an employer is able to tell the type of candidates
seeking blue-collar jobs, i.e., θM , pay them a wage of ω1 and reap productivity gains of
yM |e1. His profit is calculated as the diﬀerence between productivity gains and wage
payments. The non-negative profit constraint, or individual rationality constraint, is
then:
yM |e1 − ω1 ≥ 0. (2.16)
From the employers’ perspective, candidates of white-collar jobs may be type L or
type H agents. The probability to detect the true type is p2. Obviously, the produc-
tivity of type L agents is lower than the average productivity of pooling type L and
type H agents. Consequently, the probability of taking white-collar jobs for type L
agents is (1−p2). Type H agents will always be employed because their productivity is
above the average. Then the probability that agents taking white-collar jobs are type
L agents is (1−p2)φL
(1−p2)φL+φH
. For type H agents, their probability is φH
(1−p2)φL+φH
. The ex-
pected productivity of a white-collar worker is
³
(1−p2)φL
(1−p2)φL+φH
yL|e2 + φH(1−p2)φL+φH yH |e2
´
and the corresponding wage is ω2. Then in the white-collar sector, the non-negative
profit constraint requires:µ
(1− p2)φL
(1− p2)φL + φH
yL|e2 +
φH
(1− p2)φL + φH
yH |e2
¶
− ω2 ≥ 0. (2.17)
An employer-competitive labor market induces constraints (2.16) and (2.17) to be
binding. Substituting yL|e2 , yM |e1 and yH |e2 in equation (2.1) into constraints (2.16)
and (2.17) and solving for ω1 and ω2, one obtains
ω1 = θM + e1, (2.18)
and
ω2 =
(1− p2)φLθL + φHθH
(1− p2)φL + φH
+ e1 + e2. (2.19)
Type M agents may not want to take white-collar jobs, because their wage is
diluted by low ability type L agents. If type M agents pursue only undergradu-
ate education and take blue-collar jobs with a wage ω1, the incentive compatibility
condition requires that:
ω1 − CM(e1) ≥ ω2 − CM(e1)− CM(e2). (2.20)
For type L agents, the probability for securing a white-collar job oﬀer is (1− p2).
Likewise, if a type L agent pursues only undergraduate education and applies for a
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blue-collar job, the probability of getting such a job will be (1 − p1). Then taking
white-collar jobs brings type L agents an expected wage level of (1 − p2)ω2 at an
education cost of [CL(e1) + CL(e2)]. Working as a blue-collar worker however, earns
(1−p1)ω1 at an education cost of CL(e1). Then the incentive compatibility constraint
for a type L agent to pursue both education levels is:
(1− p1)ω1 − CL(e1) ≤ (1− p2)ω2 − CL(e1)− CL(e2). (2.21)
For type H agents, taking white-collar jobs earns ω2 after an education cost of
[CH(e1)+CH(e2)]. But if they mimic typeM agents as blue-collar workers, they earn
ω1 with a corresponding education cost of CH(e1). Then the incentive compatibility
condition for type H agents to pursue both education levels requires that:
ω2 − CH(e1)− CH(e2) ≥ ω1 − CH(e1). (2.22)
The individual rationality constraints are straightforward, as they need to guan-
rantee non-negative utility for each type of agents, as shown in the following:
ω1 − CM(e1) ≥ 0, (2.23)
(1− p2)ω2 − CL(e1)− CL(e2) ≥ 0 (2.24)
and
ω2 − CH(e1)− CH(e2) ≥ 0. (2.25)
Since the defining feature of the South model is the government’s mandate of
universal undergraduate education for all types of agents and furthermore type L
agents also pursue both education levels as type H agents do, the university needs to
maximize the following objective function:
max
γ1,γ2
R = γ1 + (φL + φH)γ2 (2.26)
subject to (2.20), (2.21) , (2.22) , (2.23) , (2.24) , and (2.25).
Obviously this is a linear programming problem. We use the graph below to
illustrate what conditions are binding, while others are not.
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Figure 3. Linear Programming for the South model
In Figure 3, Line 1 to Line 6 correspond to constraints (2.20) to (2.25). The
shaded area in Figure 3 represents the feasible solution set of the problem (2.26).
In order to assure that this feasible set is not empty, line 3 must lie above line 1.
Mathematically this translates into the following simple condition:
Assumption 1. For type L agents, the detection loss of entry level job, p1ω1,
is smaller than the detection loss of managerial level job, p2ω2, in particular, in
equilibrium the following holds,
p1ω1 > p2ω2. (2.27)
Condition (2.27) ensures that the solution to (2.26) is nonempty, since when p1
and p2 are too close, a binding (2.20) is in conflict with (2.21) and (2.22). Intuitively,
additional conditions (on p1 and p2) must be imposed to ensure that the white-collar
wages/education costs combo is not attractive enough for type M agents, but still
attractive enough for type L agents. In other words, p2 must be suﬃciently small
compared to p1 such that type L agents would pursue graduate studies.
Because the iso-revenue curves of the universities are steeper than lines 5 and
6, the equilibrium should lie in the intersecton of line 1 and line 5, which means
constraints (2.20) and (2.24) are binding, while others are excessive. To summarize:
1. Constraint (2.20) is binding. This is because the university can decrease grad-
uate tuition and increase undergraduate tuition by the same or even a larger
amount to increase its revenue without aﬀecting all other inequalities. Thus
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the equilibrium graduate tuition is determined by the binding condition (2.20)
so as to avoid type M agents to mimic other types.
2. Both constraints (2.21) and (2.22) are excessive, indicating that both type H
agents and L agents prefer to pursue graduate education.
3. Constraint (2.23) holds in strict inequality. Compared to (2.9) in the North
model where individual rationality constraint for the typeM agents is binding,
here it is not. And type M agents in fact gain informational rent. This is
because the university would decreases tuition to attract type L agents such
that their individual rationality constraint is binding.
4. Constraint (2.24) is binding. This is because the university can raise undergrad-
uate and education tuition to increase CL(e2). This implies that in equilibrium
type L agents have no rent.
5. Constraint (2.25) is excessive. This is a common result in the adverse selection
literature in that type H agents usually have informational rent in equilibrium.
Provided that constraints (2.20) and (2.24) are binding, solving for constraints
(2.20) and (2.24) for γ1 and γ2 yields
γ1 = ω1 − p2ω2 −
e21
2θL
− e
2
2
2θL
+
e22
2θM
, (2.28)
and
γ2 = ω2 − ω1 −
e22
2θM
. (2.29)
Substituting ω1 and ω2 in equations (2.18) and (2.19) into equations (2.28) and
(2.29), one obtains the relationship between the tuition and education intensities,
that is,
γ1 = θM − p2e2 + (1− p2)e1 −
e21
2θL
−(θM − θL)e
2
2
2θLθM
− p2
(1− p2)φLθL + p2φHθH
(1− p2)φL + φH
,
and
γ2 = −θM + e2 −
e22
2θM
+
(1− p2)φLθL + φHθH
(1− p2)φL + φH
.
Table 2 lists the equilibrium education intensities, wages and tuitions of the max-
imization problems (problem (2.26)), which jointly make up Proposition 2.
Table 2: Equilibrium Education Intensities, Wages and Tuitions in a Transition
Economy
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Variables Education (j) 1 2
Subscripts Job (k) 1 2
Education Intensities
¡
e∗j
¢
(1− p2)θL θL−(φM+p2)θLθM−φMθL θM
Wages (ω∗k) θM + (1− p2)θL
(1− p2)θL
+ (1−p2)φLθL+φHθH
(1−p2)φL+φH
+θL−(φM+p2)θLθM−φMθL
θM
Tuitions
¡
γ∗j
¢ θM + (1−p2)
2
2
θL
−p2 (1−p2)φLθL+p2φHθH(1−p2)φL+φH
− (1−φM−p2)(1−φM )(θL+θM )
2(θM−φMθL)2
+ (1−φM−p2)[(2φM+1)θL−θM ]p2
2(θM−φMθL)2
(1−p2)φLθL+φHθH
(1−p2)φL+φH
− θM
− (1+φM−p2)
2θ2LθH
2(θM−φMθL)2
+ (1−φM−p2)θLθMθH
(θM−φMθL)2
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium of the South model, where all agents receive un-
dergraduate education, and both type L and H agents receive both undergraduate and
graduate education, the equilibrium education intensities, wages and tuitions are pro-
vided in Table 2.
Points A∗ and B∗ in Figure 4 represent the semi-pooling equilibrium in this model.
U∗M1 and U
∗
M2 are in parallel with curves represented by UM1 = 0 and UM2 = 0
respectively. The sum of equilibrium tuitions, γ∗1 + γ∗2, is depicted along the vertical
axis. The equilibrium education intensities, e∗1 and e∗2 lie along the horizontal axis.
e2*
e
w
O e1*
UM2=0
UL2= 0
UM1=0
UH1=0
UH2=0
B*
A*
r1* +r2*
A
B
C
D
UL1 = 0
U*M2U*M1
Figure 4. A Semi-pooling Equilibrium in the South model
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Several observations follow from Figure 4:
• That A∗ is at the intersection of U∗M1 and U∗M2 suggests that in equilibrium, type
M agents are indiﬀerent between pursuing both education levels and pursuing
only undergraduate education;
• Point A∗ is above the curve represented by UH2 = 0, which indicates that type
H agents have informational rent in equilibrium;
• That point A∗ is on the curve represented by UL2 = 0 indicates that type L
agents have no rent in equilibrium;
• Point B∗ is below the curve represented by UL1 = 0, indicating that type L
agents also pursue both education levels;
• Point B∗ is above the curve represented by UM1 = 0, indicating that type M
agents have informational rent in equilibrium.
To compare to the North model, we also show the North’s separating equilibrium
in Figure 4, which is labeled as A and B. Clearly, education intensities decrease,
considering that points A and B are to the right of points A∗ and B∗ respectively.
An algebraic proof of this observation is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Education intensities of both undergraduate and graduate education
in the North model are higher than those in the South model.
Proof. The undergraduate education intensity in the North model, given by Table
1, equals θM , which is obviously greater than one in a transition economy, given by
Table 2, (1− p2)θL.
The graduate education intensity in the Southmodel, given by Table 2, is θL−(φM+p2)θLθM−φMθL θM .
Note that
θL − (φM + p2)θL < θL − φMθL < θM − φMθL,
and thus θL−(φM+p2)θLθH−φMθL is smaller than 1, leading to
θL−(φM+p2)θL
θM−φMθL
θM being less than
θM , and hence θH , which is the graduate education intensity in the North model.
Hence, education intensities for both undergraduate and graduate levels are higher
in the North model.
Proposition 2 suggests that admission of type L agents into college dilutes the
overall ability of university graduates and thus “inflates” the education value. Indeed,
admission of type L agents can increase the employment rate and may also increase
revenues of the university due to a larger student enrollment base. Nevertheless,
more students admitted on the other hand may also entail a negative impact in that
the deterioration of education intensity caused by type L agents will consequently
decrease tuition levels and thus adversely aﬀect university revenues. The following
corollary provides a condition for which the negative eﬀect of admitting type L agents
(lowered tuition levels) dominates the positive eﬀect (enlarged enrollment base).
17
Corollary 4 University revenues in the market-oriented economy are higher, condi-
tional on that the ability of type H agents is suﬃciently high, i.e.,
θH >
(1 + φL)(θM − φMθL)2 + (1 + 2φM)p2
[(1− p2)φL + φH ](θM − φMθL)2φH
θL −
φM + φH
φH
θM , (2.30)
and the detection rate of managerial level job, p2, is smaller than (1− φM), i.e.,
p2 < 1− φM . (2.31)
The proof is relegated to the appendix. Corollary 4 indicates that universities in a
free economy benefit from the invisible hand in regulating eﬃciently optimal choices
of both undergraduate and graduate degree holders. More specifically, when abilities
of typeM and type H agents are relatively high, universities in a free economy would
reject type L agents and maintain high productivity reputations of their graduates.
On the other hand, expected productivities of the graduates suﬀer in universities in
the South model, because admission of type L agents is mandatory by government
policies. Hence, graduates in a free economy earn relatively more compared to the
same level graduates in a transitional economy, and universities in a free market
economy therefore can extract more rents from students.
Proposition 5 Suppose (2.30) and the ability of the M-type agents is high enough,
i.e.,
θM − φLθL − φHθH > 0,
then social welfare is higher in a market-oriented economy than that in a transition
economy.
Proof. See appendix.
To summarize, we derive the equilibrium education intensities and tuition levels
in two closed economies, one for the North and one for the South. What sets these
two economies apart is the government’s policy towards universal undergraduate ed-
ucation in the South. The result of a mandatory enrollment expansion in a transition
economy is decreased education intensities. Furthermore, if the abilities of type M
and type H agents are relatively high, universities earn less and social welfare loss re-
sults in a transition economy. In the next section, we allow for student flows between
the two economies.
3 International Talent Flow
In this section, we consider a two-country model, where one is a developing country, or
the South, while the other, is a developed country, or the North. Propositions 1 and
2 imply respectively that the equilibrium in the North could be separating and the
equilibrium in the South could be semi-pooling. Assume that students must pursue
undergraduate education in their home country.11 Denote α as the percentage of
11This is generally true because of cultural, language and other barriers.
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undergraduate students in the South who go to the North for further graduate studies.
Some of them would return to the South, whom we call overseas returnees, while
others enter the labor market in the North. Denote β as the proportion of the overseas
graduates that go back to their home country. Thus firms in the South can have three
types of payrolls: one blue-collar, one managerial type taken by overseas returnees,
and another managerial type for indigenously trained graduates. Let decoration ˜
denote association with overseas returnees. Let S and N to denote respectively the
South, or the transition economy, and the North, or the free market economy. Leteω2S to be the wage oﬀered to overseas returnees, ep2S be the detection rate of jobs
taken by overseas returnees. By detection rate, we mean the firm’s probability of
inferring correctly a job seeker’s true type.
We assume that the detection rate is larger for a blue-collar job than for a man-
agerial job, i.e., p1 > p2. This is because the performance of a managerial worker is
often more diﬃcult to ascertain and sometimes subject to uncertainties of external
factors. For simplicity, we normalize p1 to 1.
The detection rate is also assumed to be monotonically increasing in the excellence
ratio, δ, which is defined as the ratio between the number of type H agents and type
L agents. Specifically, the excellence ratio of an agent pursuing graduate education
in the South, δ2S, is
δ2S =
(1− αL)φL
(1− αH)φH
.
For agents in the South but pursuing graduate education in the North and join
its labor force afterwards, the excellence ratio, δ2N , is
δ2N =
(1− βL)αLφL
(1− βH)αHφH + φH
.
For agents in the South but pursuing graduate education in the North and yet
return to work in the South, the excellence ratio, eδ2N , is
eδ2N = βLαLφLβHαHφH .
For a type L overseas graduate, the education cost is CL(e1S) + CL(e2N). If he
returns to the South, the expected wage is (1 − ep2S)eω2S, and the utility is (1 −ep2S)eω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N). If he chooses to stay in the North, he would oﬀered a
job with an expected wage level of (1−p2N)ω2N , and his utility becomes (1−ep2S)eω2S−
CL(e1S)−CL(e2N). Then he compares the expected wages in both countries to make
the return-or-stay decision, i.e.,
(1− p2N)ω2N − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N) S (1− ep2S)eω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N),
which can be simplified as
(1− p2N)ω2N S (1− ep2S)eω2S. (3.1)
Constraint (3.1) indicates that the country residence choice for type L overseas
graduates is driven by the trade-oﬀ between the detection rates and the wage rates
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in the two countries. If the LHS of (3.1) dominates, all type L agents will return to
the South and vice versa.
Similarly, for a typeH overseas graduate, his country residence decision essentially
boils down to
ω2N S eω2S (3.2)
which is of course trivial — the type H agent would only choose to stay in a country
with a higher wage rate.
We make one more assumption that the education levels of overseas graduates
and the native graduates in the North are identical. Then the ex post productivity
of a native type H agent must be also identical to that of an overseas type H agent
from the South. That is, eyH = θH + e1N + e2N ,
and similarly for an overseas type L agent from the South, his ex post productivity
is eyL = θL + e1N + e2N .
From the employers’ perspective, their profits from production must be non-
negative, and this constraint must hold in both countries, i.e.,
eπ2S = E2S[ey]− eω2S = βLαLφLeyL + βHαHφHeyHβLαLφL + βHαHφH − eω2S ≥ 0,
and
π2N = E2N [y]− ω2N =
(1− βL)αLφLeyL + ((1− βH)αHφH + φH)eyH
(1− βL)αLφL + (1− βH)αHφH + φH
− ω2N ≥ 0.
But since market competition in both countries would force the above two con-
straints to be binding, we then have:
βLαLφLeyL + βHαHφHeyH
βLαLφL + βHαHφH
− eω2S = 0, (3.3)
and
(1− βL)αLφLeyL + ((1− βH)αHφH + φH)eyH
(1− βL)αLφL + (1− βH)αHφH + φH
− ω2N = 0. (3.4)
Type L agents have to mix themselves with type H agents to avoid being fully
screened by employers. This means either side of constraints (3.1) and (3.2) cannot
dominate each other. Hence, constraints (3.1) and (3.2) must be binding. In other
words,
ω2N = eω2S,
and
p2N = ep2S. (3.5)
Then we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Among type L agents, the percentage of type L returnees, βL, is
smaller than that of type H returnees among type H agents, βH. Furthermore, the
percentage of type L returnees, βL, increases in the proportion of type H agents, αH .
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Proof. From equation (3.5) we know that the detection rates of the two labor mar-
kets are the same. Since the detection rate is assumed as a monotonically increasing
function of the excellence ratio, the excellence ratios of the two labor markets must
equalize. It is then straightforward to show that the percentage of the type L re-
turnees, βL, equals βH
³
1− 1
1+αH
´
, which is greater than βH and increases in αH .
An immediate corollary of Proposition 6 is that more type L overseas graduates
from the South will stay in the North, seemingly suggesting a brain drain problem.
However, when a large proportion of the type L students go to the North (in pooling
with type H students), this is neither really brain drain, in which high talents are
supposed to outflow permanently, nor really brain bank, in which case most of the
typeH overseas students are supposed to return. On the contrary, we have an outflow
of low talent type L students that dilutes the quality of the North’s labor market.
We venture to call this phenomenon lame-drain.
To have a better understanding of the lame-drain eﬀect, it is important to derive
the equilibrium percentages of overseas graduate students against home endowment
for both agent types in a two country general equilibrium model. Note that in ad-
dition to the perfect competition labor market conditions (3.3) and (3.4), other IR
constraints for employers are
π1k = yM |e1τ − ω1τ ≥ 0, τ = N,S, (3.6)
and
π2S =
µ
φL(1− αL)
φL(1− αL) + φH(1− αH)
yL|e2S +
φH
φL(1− αL) + φH(1− αH)
yH |e2S
¶
−ω2S ≥ 0.
(3.7)
Constraint (3.6) indicates that employers in both the North and the South have
incentives to oﬀer blue-collar jobs to type M agents. Condition (3.7) implies that
employers in the South oﬀering managerial jobs have incentives to hire a pool of type
H and L agents. Because it is an employer-competitive labor market, both constraints
(3.6) and (3.7) must be binding. Then the equilibrium wages of the various types of
jobs are listed as follows:
ω∗1τ = yM |e1τ , τ = N,S,
ω∗2S =
µ
φL(1− αL)
φL(1− αL) + φH(1− αH)
yL +
φH
φL(1− αL) + φH(1− αH)
yH
¶
|e2S ,
and eω∗2S = ω∗2N = (1− βL)αLφLeyL + ((1− βH)αHφH + φH)eyH(1− βL)αLφL + (1− βH)αHφH + φH .
The IC constraints can be rewritten as the following:
ω1S − CL(e1S) ≤ (1− p2S)ω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2S), (3.8)
ω1N − CH(e1N) ≤ ω2N − CH(e1N)− CH(e2N), (3.9)
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and
ω1S − CH(e1S) ≤ ω2S − CH(e1S)− CH(e2S). (3.10)
Constraints (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) rule out the possibility that type L agents
in the South and type H agents both in the North and the South pursue only an
undergraduate education. The IC constraints of type M agents in the South are
given in the inequalities (3.11) and (3.12), reflecting the fact that type M agents in
the South do not pursue graduate education in either country. Similarly, type M
agents in the North also do not pursue graduate education as illustrated in (3.13),
i.e.:
ω1S − CM(e1S) ≥ (1− p2S)ω2S − CM(e1S)− CM(e2S), (3.11)
ω1S − CM(e1S) ≥ (1− p2N)ω2N − CM(e1S)− CM(e2N), (3.12)
and
ω1N − CM(e1N) ≥ (1− p2N)ω2N − CM(e1N)− CM(e2N). (3.13)
Since not all type L andH agents in the South go overseas, theymust be indiﬀerent
between pursuing graduate education at home and abroad. That means their payoﬀ
function should be the same staying at home or going abroad, leading to constraints
(3.14) and (3.15) as a result:
Two more IC constraints are also considered in this section, which are
(1− p2S)ω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2S) = (1− p2N)ω2N − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N), (3.14)
and
ω2S − CH(e1S)− CH(e2S) = ω2N − CH(e1S)− CH(e2N). (3.15)
The IR constraints of type L agents in the South are
(1− p2S)ω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2S) ≥ 0, (3.16)
and
(1− p2N)ω2N − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N) ≥ 0, (3.17)
which indicate that they have incentives to pursue graduate education either at home
or abroad. TypeM agents in both countries only pursue undergraduate education in
their respective home country, leading to IR constraints (3.18) and (3.19) as below:
ω1S − CM(e1S) ≥ 0, (3.18)
and
ω1N − CM(e1N) ≥ 0. (3.19)
As for type H agents, those in the South would pursue graduate education either
at home or abroad, leading to their IR constraints (3.20) and (3.21), while those in
the North would do the same but only in their home country as governed by (3.22).
ω2S − CH(e1S)− CH(e2S) ≥ 0, (3.20)
and
ω2N − CH(e1S)− CH(e2N) ≥ 0. (3.21)
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The IR constraint of native type H agents in the North is
ω2N − CH(e1N)− CH(e2N) ≥ 0, (3.22)
which indicates that native type H agents in the North have incentive to pursue
graduate education.
The process of finding binding conditions from constraints (3.8) to (3.22) is similar
to the excercise in section 2 in that given conditions (2.27), (2.30) and (2.31) to hold,
constraints (3.9), (3.10), (3.16) and (3.19) should be binding. Condition (3.14) implies
that constraint (3.17) must be binding. Other conditions are satisfied automatically
under conditions (2.27), (2.30), and (2.31) given in section 3. These findings suggest
the general equilibrium in an open economy will entail:
1. Type M agents both in the North and the South only pursue undergraduate
education in their respective home country; type M agents in the North gain
zero utility, while those in the South have utility surplus;
2. Type L agents in the North receive no education and hence are unemployed;
3. Some of the type L agents in the South go abroad for graduate study, while
other type L agents in the South stay at home country to pursue graduate
education; they all gain zero utility;
4. Some of the typeH agents in the South go abroad to pursue graduate education,
while others stay at home for graduate study; they all gain some utility surplus;
5. Type L and H agents in the South are indiﬀerent between staying at home
or going abroad when pursuing graduate education and finding employment
afterwards;
6. Native type H agents in the North pursue both graduate and undergraduate
education and gain some positive rent.
Now, constraints (3.9), (3.10), (3.16) and (3.19) can be simplified as the following:
γ1S = ω1S − CM(e1S), (3.23)
γ1S + γ2S = (1− p2S)ω2S − CL(e1S)− CL(e2S), (3.24)
γ1N = ω1N − CM(e1N), (3.25)
and
γ1N + γ2N = (1− p2N)ω2N − CL(e1S)− CL(e2N). (3.26)
Under these constraints, universities are faced with the problem of maximizing
their revenues. Specifically, universities in the South maximize (3.27) and those in
the North maximize (3.28):
max
γ1S ,γ2S
RS = γ1S + ((1− αL)φL + (1− αH)φH)γ2S. (3.27)
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subject to equations (3.23) and (3.25).
The solutions to the two maximization problems above are listed in the following
table:
max
γ1N ,γ2N
RN = (φM + φH)γ1N + (αLφL + αHφH + φH)γ2N . (3.28)
subject to equations (3.24) and (3.26).
The solutions to the two maximization problems above are listed in the following
table:
Table 3: Equilibrium Education Intensities, Wages and Tuitions in an Open
Economy
Variables Location (τ) S S N N
Job (k) 1 2 1 2
Subscripts Education (j) 1 2 1 2
Education Intensities
¡
e∗jτ
¢
Ψ1 (1− p2S)θL θM (1− p2N)θL
Wages (ω∗kτ) θM +Ψ1
Ψ1 +Ψ2
+(1− p2S)θL
2θM
Ψ3 + θM
+(1− p2N)θL
Tuitions
¡
γ∗jτ
¢ Ψ1 + θM
− 1
2θM
Ψ21
1
2
(1− p2S)2θL
+(1− p2S)Ψ2
−θM − p2SΨ1
−θM−θL
2θLθM
Ψ21
3
2
θM
1
2
(1− p2N)2θL
+(1− p2N)Ψ3
−(1
2
+ p2N)θM
− 1
2θL
Ψ21
where
Ψ1 =
θM − ((1− αL)φL + (1− αH)φH)p2SθM
θL + ((1− αL)φL + (1− αH)φH)(θM − θL)
θL,
Ψ2 =
(1− αL)φLθL + (1− αH)φHθH
(1− αL)φL + (1− αH)φH
,
and
Ψ3 =
(1− p2N)αLφLθL + αHφHθH + φHθH
αL(1− p2N)φL + αHφH + φH
.
Combining (3.14), (3.15) and the equilibrium results in Table 3 leads to the fol-
lowing proposition whose proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Proposition 7 When the proportion of type H student going abroad for graduate
study is 1
2
, the equilibrium proportion of type L students going abroad solves the fol-
lowing equation:
2θL + ((1− αL)φL + 12φH)(θM − 2θL)
θL + ((1− αL)φL + 12φH)(θM − θL)
+
(1− p2N(αL))φH
φH + φM
=
2θL
θM − θL
.
Recall that βL, the proportion of the type L overseas graduates that return to
work in their home country, is 1
2
αH
1+αH
, given by proposition 4. From this proposition,
we have αH = 12 , and consequently βL =
1
6
.
We now depict the general equilibrium in Figure 4. The equilibrium in the North,
as is shown, moves from A to AN , due to the dilution of type L agents from the South.
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In Figure 4, variables with superscript N refer to corresponding variables of agents
from the North and with superscript S refer to corresponding variables of agents from
the South. The figure illustrates that the equilibrium graduate education intensity
in the North decreases such that some of the type L agents from the South have
incentives to pursue graduate education in the North. Moreover, that AN is below A
implies that wages for graduate degree holders in the North are lowered (compared
to the close economy case).
e
w
O
e1N* e2N*
A
B
UNL2=0
UNM1=0
UNL1=0
UNM2=0
UNH1=0
UNH2=0
r2N*
r1N*
USL1=0
USL2=0
C
D
AN
Figure 5. Non-Brain Drain Equilibrium in the North
Our theory suggests that the brain drain phenomenon is not just restricted to
talents, but also low-ability students as well. Although this may appear novel and
striking at a first glance, it is actually in line with the existing literature. For instance,
Commander et al (2003) argue that screening of immigrant by the receiving country
is key for the indigenous country’s human capital accumulation, because if only the
best are selected, low skill ones will have little incentive to acquire human capital
at home. In our model, the low ability ones’ incentive to pursue graduate studies is
similar, although our focus is the ability mismatch problem.
Regarding our theory’s relationship with recently observed empirical patterns,
our model oﬀers some good intuition. For instance, our theory is consistent with
the empirical finding by Reitz (2001) who estimates that the earning deficit in 1996
in Canada was largely due to immigrants earning a lower rate of return on their
education compared to natives. Hunter et al (2009) find that immigrants in the UK
and US win Nobel Prizes less frequently than before. They use the low mobility cost
to interpret such a trend but are unable to explain why US has more Nobel Laureates
now. Our theory is congruent with this observation as a larger (recipient) country is
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able to maintain a higher average productivity level, since it has a larger population
base against a given lame brain dilution from developing countries.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section we use the 2010 U.S. Census data and provide three pieces of collab-
orating empirical evidence: for Chinese students who moved to the U.S. after the
higher education expansion in China, (1) the return to a graduate degree is lower
than those who moved before, suggesting that their overall quality may be lower;
(2) low-wage earners are more severely penalized in labor market while high-wage
earners are not, suggesting more “lames” immigrants among them; (2) those with
low abilities are more likely to obtain a graduate degree.
We use the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) data. The ACS is a 1-in-
100 national random sample of the U.S. population. The data are downloaded from
www.ipums.org (Ruggles, et al., 2010). We construct a Chinese, college-educated
worker sample tailored for our theoretical model. Specifically, we select an employed
worker who:
1) was born in China,
2) has a Chinese ethnicity identity,
3) has a bachelor degree or above,
4) age less than 40,
5) immigrated in the U.S. in 1990 or after,
6) worked full time last year (weekly hours usually worked is 35 hours or
more),
7) reported positive wage and salary income.
We restrict age to less than or equal to 40 years because if a Chinese student
graduated from a college in 1990 in China (average age would be 20), his or her age
would be around 40 in the 2010 ACS data. We also restrict the year of moving to the
US to be 1990 or after because very few Chinese students moved to the U.S. before
1990. The hourly wages are then winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The final
sample consists of 1477 workers.
Since the higher education expansion in China mainly took place in 1999 and
afterwards, and the earliest batch of college graduates after expansion moved to the
U.S. in 2003 to pursue a graduate degree, we create a dummy variable, Expansion=1,
if the year of moving to the US is 2003 or after. We estimate a standard wage model
including the Expansion dummy. The Expansion dummy is expected to be negative
and significant if the foreign student cohort from China since the higher education
expansion has lower abilities in general.
We specify the wage model as follows:
logWage = α+ βX+γ · Expansion+ ε, (1)
where Wage is hourly wage calculated as annual wage and salary income divided
by the product of hours usually worked per week and weeks worked last year; X is
a set of individual characteristics; α is the constant term, β and γ are coeﬃcient
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vectors to be estimated; ε is the disturbance term. Individual characteristics are
standard demographic variables, including gender, age, age squared to control for
work experience, graduate degree dummy, single dummy, years in the U.S., occupation
category dummies, and industry category dummies.12 In a slightly diﬀerent model, we
interact the graduate degree dummy with Expansion. Table 4 reports the summary
statistics of key variables and shows that the variations in hourly wages across workers
within each education degree group are substantial.
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable Sample size Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Hourly wage 1477 31.29 18.17 3.57 118.04
Hourly wage
(Bachelor degree holders)
411 23.52 15.37 3.57 95.24
Hourly wage
(Graduate degree holders)
1066 34.28 18.29 3.90 118.04
Log(hourly wage) 1477 3.25 0.66 1.27 4.77
Male (dummy) 1477 0.50 0.50 0 1
Single (dummy) 1477 0.25 0.43 0 1
Age 1477 32.97 5.07 20 40
Bachelor degree (dummy) 1477 0.28 0.45 0 1
Graduate degree (dummy) 1477 0.72 0.45 0 1
Years in the US 1477 9.27 5.19 0 20
Note: sample size is 1477 workers. S.D. stands for standard deviation.
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (1). The demographic
variables have reasonable coeﬃcients and are not of our particular interest. If a
college degree holder obtains a graduate degree, his or her hourly wage will increase
by about 23.5%. The coeﬃcient of Expansion, capturing the cohort eﬀect of higher
education expansion in China on foreign students in the U.S. from China, is -0.1754
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that in our sample consisting of Chinese
students with a college degree or above, those who moved to the U.S. since 2003
receive about 18% lower hourly wages than do the cohort that moved to the U.S.
before 2003, suggesting that the overall quality of Chinese immigrants since 2003
might be lower.
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (1) with the in-
teraction of Graduate degree dummy with Expansion. The Expansion cohort with
a graduate degree receives about 24% less (0.127-0.364) hourly wages than do the
graduate degree holders who moved to the U.S. before 2003. This further confirms
that the overall quality of student cohort after the higher education expansion in
China may be lower.
We have also considered the possibility of model (1) having the omitted variable
bias, because unobserved ability in the disturbance term may be correlated with the
education variable, biasing the estimate of Graduate degree coeﬃcient upward. Given
12Graduate degrees include master degree, professional degree beyond bachelor degree, and Ph.D.
degree.
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our data structure, we adopt a strategy proposed by Fu and Ross (2013) and use a
worker’s residential location as a proxy for unobserved ability since people sort into
diﬀerent residential locations based on income, tastes, and unobserved ability. The
smallest geographic unit in the ACS data is the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA),
so we add the residential PUMA fixed eﬀects to model (1).13 The results are reported
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. The coeﬃcient of Graduate degree attenuates by 24%
in column 3 and by 17% in column 4, consistent with what Fu and Ross (2013) find
using the 2000 decennial census data. However, the attenuation of the coeﬃcient
of Expansion in column 3 is much smaller (11%), and the coeﬃcient of Graduate
degree interacting with Expansion decreases only slightly (5%), suggesting that the
Expansion cohort eﬀect is robust to controlling for unobserved abilities.
Table 5. Eﬀect of higher education expansion in China on US Chinese immigrants’ wage
Variable 1 2 3 4
Male
0.0820***
(0.0277)
0.0844***
(0.0274)
0.1002***
(0.0304)
0.1023***
(0.0297)
Single
-0.0014
(0.0426)
0.0177
(0.0423)
0.0367
(0.0587)
0.0546
(0.0585)
Age
0.2170***
(0.0406)
0.2442***
(0.0400)
0.2369***
(0.0540)
0.2674***
(0.0538)
Age square
-0.0029***
(0.0006)
-0.0034***
(0.0006)
-0.0033***
(0.0008)
-0.0038***
(0.0008)
Graduate degree
0.2353***
(0.0398)
0.3835***
(0.0494)
0.1788***
(0.0503)
0.3185***
(0.0603)
Years in US
0.0203***
(0.0048)
0.0256***
(0.0049)
0.0235***
(0.0060)
0.0287***
(0.0061)
Expansion
-0.1754***
(0.0502)
0.1273*
(0.0778)
-0.1547**
(0.0683)
0.1353
(0.0987)
Grad degree×Expansion -0.3640***
(0.0697)
-0.3459***
(0.0841)
Constant
-1.0111
(0.6592)
-1.5980**
(0.6538)
-1.3489
(0.8850)
-1.9671**
(0.8879)
Sample size 1477 1477 1477 1477
Residential location
fixed eﬀects No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.428 0.466 0.474
Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of hourly wage. Independent vari-
ables also include 23 occupation category dummies and 15 industry cate-
gory dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors (robust esti-
mator). Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 include 342 residential
13PUMAs generally follow the boundaries of county groups, single counties, or census-defined
“places.” A residential PUMA contains at least 100,000 residents. If the population exceeds 200,000
residents, they are divided into as many PUMAs of 100,000+ residents as possible.
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PUMA fixed eﬀects and standard errors are clustered at the residential
PUMA level.
This decline in overall quality of Chinese immigrants since 2003 could be due
to more “lames” or more low-ability students moving into the U.S. after the higher
education expansion while high-ability students have always maintained the same
quality. To test this hypothesis, we estimate model (1) using simultaneous quantile
regression for the 5th and 95th quantiles of wage earners:
logWage0.05 = α0.05 + β0.05X+γ0.05 · Expansion+ ε0.05, (2)
logWage0.95 = α0.95 + β0.95X+γ0.95 · Expansion+ ε0.95,
where 0.05 and 0.95 denote the 5th and 95th quantiles of the dependent variable. As
a robustness check, we also estimate model (2) for the 10th and 90th quantiles and
15th and 85th quantiles. The results are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Eﬀect of Expansion in China on US Chinese immigrants’ wage by quantile
Variable Quantile of log (hourly wage)
0.05 0.95 0.10 0.90 0.15 0.85
Male
0.1121
(0.0902)
0.0289
(0.0495)
0.1262∗∗
(0.0635)
0.0948∗∗
(0.0396)
0.1271∗∗
(0.0536)
0.1167∗∗∗
(0.0399)
Single
-0.0917
(0.1033)
0.1023
(0.0734)
0.0685
(0.0898)
0.0270
(0.0731)
-0.0915
(0.0729)
0.0108
(0.0650)
Age
0.0447
(0.1129)
0.2336∗∗∗
(0.0789)
0.2197∗∗
(0.0974)
0.216∗∗∗
(0.0609)
0.2081∗∗∗
(0.0818)
0.2509∗∗∗
(0.0603)
Age2
-0.0002
(0.0017)
-0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0012)
-0.0028∗
(0.0015)
-0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0009)
-0.0027∗∗
(0.0012)
-0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0009)
Graduate
0.3131∗∗
(0.1338)
0.0570
(0.0667)
0.2903∗∗∗
(0.1077)
0.1153∗∗
(0.0566)
0.2763∗∗∗
(0.0783)
0.1561∗∗
(0.0566)
Years US
0.0024
(0.00185)
0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0080)
0.0144
(0.0108)
0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0068)
0.0253∗∗∗
(0.0091)
0.0232∗∗∗
(0.0071)
Expansion
-0.4086∗∗∗
(0.1511)
0.0209
(0.0747)
-0.3003∗∗∗
(0.1157)
-0.0329
(0.0680)
-0.1819∗
(0.1063)
-0.0609
(0.0613)
F test 5.53 3.85 1.06
Sample size 1477
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.180 0.269 0.184 0.292 0.195
Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of hourly wage. Independent vari-
ables also include 23 occupation category dummies and 15 industry cate-
gory dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors estimated by
bootstrapping with 200 replications. Superscripts “***”, “**”, and “*”
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
F test is for testing whether or not the coeﬃcients of Expansion in the
paired quantile regressions are equal.
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Table 6 shows that for top wage earners, such as 95th, 90th, and 85th quantile
wage earners, the coeﬃcients of Expansion are all small (between -0.02 and -0.06)
and statistically insignificant, suggesting that high-ability Chinese immigrants in the
Expansion cohort are similar to the previous cohorts. However, for bottom wage
earners, such as 5th, 10th, and 15th quantile wage earners, the coeﬃcients of Ex-
pansion are relatively large (between -0.18 and -0.41) and statistically significant.
A plausible interpretation would be that the low ability Chinese immigrants in the
Expansion cohort really have lower ability, or put in a diﬀerent way, more “lames” in
the Expansion cohort have joined the U.S. labor markets.14
To test whether low ability students in the Expansion cohort are more likely to
obtain a graduate degree than do the before-Expansion cohort, we employ a two-
stage approach as follows. In the first stage we estimate model (1) by dropping the
Graduate degree dummy and Expansion, and then predict the residuals, labeled as
“wage residuals”. The wage residual contains wage components not explained by
the independent variables in the first stage regression, and thus can be considered
mainly coming from a worker’ education level (observed ability), unobserved ability,
and the Expansion cohort eﬀect. In the second stage, we regress Graduate degree
dummy on wage residuals, Expansion dummy, and the interaction of wage residuals
and Expansion dummy:
Graduate = α+β1Wage residuals+β2Expansion+β3Expansion×Wage residuals+ε
(3)
Model (3) is first estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the
result is reported in column 1 of Table 7. Since wage residuals are a proxy for ability,
column 1 shows that the coeﬃcient of wage residuals is about 0.23 and significant
at the 1% level, suggesting that before Expansion, workers with a high ability are
more likely to obtain a graduate degree. However, after Expansion, it is workers
with a low ability that are more likely to obtain a graduate degree (the coeﬃcient
of interaction term is about -0.27 and significant at the 1% level). As a robustness
check, we also estimate model (3) using a Probit model and the result is reported in
column 2 of Table 7. The same pattern still holds. Column 3 reports the marginal
eﬀects at the mean wage residual level for the Probit model and the marginal eﬀects
are very similar to those in column 1. Specifically, after Expansion, at the mean
wage residual level, decreasing the residual level by one unit increases the probability
of obtaining a degree by 0.27, suggesting that low ability workers in the Expansion
cohort are more likely to have pursued a graduate degree.
14We also estimate models with graduate dummy interacting with Expansion dummy using si-
multaneous quantile regressions and the patterns of the results are very similar.
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Table 7. Probability of obtaining a graduate degree
1 2 3
Variable OLS Probit Marginal Eﬀect
Expansion
-0.0129
(0.0244)
-0.0662
(0.0732)
-0.0221
(0.0246)
Wage residuals
0.2325***
(0.0288)
0.6974***
(0.0951)
0.2373***
(0.0331)
Expansion×Wage residuals -0.2659***
(0.0477)
-0.7949***
(0.1468)
-0.2704***
(0.0507)
Sample size 1477 1477
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.044 0.036
Note: Dependent variable is the Graduate dummy. Wage residuals are
predicted residuals from regressing logarithm of hourly wage on male
dummy, age, age squared, single dummy, years in the U.S., occupation
and industry category dummies. Column 1 is the ordinary least squares
regression; column 2 is the Probit regression. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors (robust estimator). Column 3 reports the marginal eﬀects
at the mean wage residual level for the Probit model. Constant term is
included in both models but is not reported. Superscripts “***”, “**”,
and “*” indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
In summary, our econometric exercises provide empirical validation for the lame-
drain phenomenon with respect to Chinese immigrants. We find students who moved
to the U.S. after the higher education expansion in China incur returns to a graduate
degree lower than those who moved before. This suggests a deteriorating quality of
immigration most likely diluted by the pool of unskilled, unqualified and previously
unemployed college graduates who went onto the US for graduate studies. For those
students with low abilities, they are more likely to obtain a graduate degree in the
US.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a phenomenon exactly the opposite of brain drain, or lame drain
as we call it, meaning that employment-based immigration from developing countries
to developed countries may not always be the smartest and brightest as they used to
be. This is an issue that has been largely neglected so far in the brain drain literature.
We formulate the brain drain problem from a general equilibrium perspective where
the impact on both originating and receiving countries are considered.
Our model indicates that the lame drain phenomenon is quite possible driven
largely by the rapid expansion of the higher education sector in developing countries
measured by enrollment, especially in China. The Great Leap Forward in higher
education as mandated by the government inevitably leads to low-ability workers
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entering the labor force. On top of the expected overall degradation of education
qualities and relaxation of graduation standards, we show the presence of a serious
mismatch problem, where those low-ability students pursue higher education that
they would not have under an education system that is free from government inter-
ventions. This brings about an adverse impact on the quality of the labor force and
the long term prospect of economic growth.
Our model also indicates the adverse impact in terms of education quality degra-
dation and education-skill mismatch in a developing country can spill over to a devel-
oped country, as a result of the international flow of human capital. This is because a
deteriorating quality of immigration can be diluted by the pool of unskilled, unqual-
ified and previously unemployed college graduates from a developing country who go
onto a developed country such as the US for graduate studies.
We then conduct an econometric exercise to provide empirical validation for the
lame drain phenomenon with respect to Chinese immigrants. We find students who
moved to the U.S. after the higher education expansion in China incur returns to a
graduate degree lower than those who moved before.
The mixed bag of drains of both brains and lames to developed countries indicates
that this is not always detrimental to the source country, as eﬀectively the source
country is exporting low productivity workers. The previous literature (Mountford,
1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1998; Vidal, 1998; and Beine, Docquier and
Rapaport, 2001) attempted to rationalize this result based on uncertainty about the
ability to migrate and the assumption that foreign firms cannot screen eﬀectively
emigrants‘ innate ability due to information asymmetry. In contrast with conclusions
from the current literature, brain drain may be globally welfare worsening, because
of the more costly semi-pooling in the developed country compared with the case of
no international talent flows. This brings about important policy implications with
respect to the recent immigration reform debate in the US. Our analysis indicates
the importance of eﬀective screening of entering foreign students by universities and
the federal government. It also stresses the federal government’s initiative to help
private companies with the job screening process with respect to foreign graduates,
and improve upon the process of how H-1 visas and work permits are issued.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Corollary 4.. It is not diﬃcult to obtain the revenue of universities in
the market-oriented economy in equilibrium, that is,
R1 =
3
2
φMθM +
1
2
φHθM +
3
2
φHθH .
and the revenue of universities in the transition economy, that is
R2 = γ∗1 + (φL + φH)γ
∗
2,
where γ∗1 and γ∗2 is given in table 2. Then the diﬀerence between universities revenues
in the two economies is
R1 −R2 =
1
2
φMθM −
(1− p2)2
2
θL − (φL + φH − p2)
(1− p2)φLθL + φHθH
(1− p2)φL + φH
+
1
2
φHθM
−(1− φM − p2)
(φM − 1)(φM − p2 + 1)θMθL2 + 2(φM − 1)θ2MθL
2(θM − φMθL)2
+
3
2
φHθH
−(1− φM − p2)
(φM + p2 − 1 + 2p2φM)θL + (φM − 1− p2)θM
2(θM − φMθL)2
. (A-1)
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By (2.31), one learns that 1 − φM − p2 = φL + φH − p2 > 0. Together with
φM − 1 < 0, it implies that
−(1− φM − p2)
(φM − 1)(φM − p2 + 1)θMθL2 + 2(φM − 1)θ2MθL
2(θM − φMθL)2
> 0,
and
−(1−φM−p2)
(φM + p2 − 1 + 2p2φM)θL + (φM − 1− p2)θM
2(θM − φMθL)2
> −(1−φM−p2)
(1 + 2φM)p2θL
2(θM − φMθL)2
.
And simplifying the RHS of equation (A-1) yields
R1 −R2 > (
3
2
− φL + φH − p2
(1− p2)φL + φH
)φHθH +
1
2
(φM + φH)θM −
(1− p2)2
2
θL
−(φL + φH − p2)
(1− p2)φLθL
(1− p2)φL + φH
− (1− φM − p2)
(1 + 2φM)p2θL
2(θM − φMθL)2
.
Note that φL + φH − p2φL > φL + φH − p2 > 0, which implies φL+φH−p2(1−p2)φL+φH < 1.
Then
R1 −R2 >
1
2
φHθH +
1
2
(φM + φH)θM −
(1 + φL)(θM − φMθL)2 + (1 + 2φM)p2
2[(1− p2)φL + φH ](θM − φMθL)2φH
θL > 0,
which is implied by
φHθH + (φM + φH)θM −
(1 + φL)(θM − φMθL)2 + (1 + 2φM)p2
[(1− p2)φL + φH ](θM − φMθL)2φH
θL > 0,
which is (2.30) after some algebra.
Proof of Proposition 5.. According to the definition, in equilibrium, the social
welfare of a market-oriented economy is
SW1 =
3
2
φMθM +
3
2
φHθH + φH
µ
θM −
θ2M
2θH
¶
,
and that of a transition economy is
SW2 = φLθL + φMθM + φHθH + (1− p2)θL + (φL + φH)
θL − (φM + p2)θL
θM − φMθL
θM
−( φL
2θL
+
φM
2θM
+
φH
2θH
)(1− p2)2θ2L − (
φL
2θL
+
φH
2θH
)
(1− φM − p2)2
(θM − φMθL)2
θ2Lθ
2
M .
Then the welfare diﬀerence is
SW1 − SW2 =
1
2
∙
φHθH + φMθM + φHθM −
(1 + φL)(θM − φMθL)2
[(1− p2)φL + φH ](θM − φMθL)2
¸
+
θM − θL + p2θL
θM − φMθL
φHθM +
µ
φL
2θL
+
φM
2θM
+
φH
2θH
¶
(1− p2)2θ2L
+
µ
φL
2θL
+
φH
2θH
¶
(1− φM − p2)2
(θM − φMθL)2
(θM − φLθL − φHθH)θ2LθM .
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Note that (2.30) implies
φHθH + φMθM + φHθM −
(1 + φL)(θM − φMθL)2θL
[(1− p2)φL + φH ](θM − φMθL)2
> 0,
Assume
θM − φLθL − φHθH > 0,
which ensuresµ
φL
2θL
+
φH
2θH
¶
(1− φM − p2)2
(θM − φMθL)2
(θM − φLθL − φHθH)θ2LθM > 0.
Therefore, because θM−θL+p2θLθM−φMθL φHθM > 0 and (
φL
2θL
+ φM
2θM
+ φH
2θH
)(1− p2)2θ2L > 0 we
have SW1 − SW2 > 0.
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